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Abstract – The variety in the physical dimensions and fissile enrichment values of the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) spent nuclear fuels, in contrast to commercial PWR and BWR fuels, requires a modified approach to criticality 
analyses toward acceptance for disposal in the national repository. The initial approach for ensuring criticality safety 
segregated these various fuels into nine distinct groups based on their fuel matrix composition. A baseline fuel type was then 
selected from each group to bound, for purposes of criticality analysis, all other fuels in that group. After these initial 
analyses, it will be necessary to demonstrate how all the fuels in the DOE inventory are bounded by the nine distinct groups. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The nine initial analyses,1 using the Monte Carlo 
N-Particle (MCNP) 4B code and known fuel matrix 
compositions specific to each fuel type, led to conceptual 
development of a variety of compartmented baskets for 
disposal. Some of these baskets required the addition of 
neutron absorbers to ensure long-term criticality safety in 
the event of water intrusion and any subsequent 
degradation inside a failed waste package. The current 
approach to fuel packaging proposes using a limited 
number of basket designs for the great variety of fuels. A 
recent study2 identified which of the “other” fuels in the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) inventory will be 
inserted into any given basket configuration. It is now 
necessary to determine if these other fuels are bounded by 
the baseline analyses. 
I.A. Objective 
The National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) 
associated with the Idaho National Laboratory has 
completed criticality analyses for a postclosure repository 
environment3 based on the selection of the Advanced Test 
Reactor (ATR) fuel as both the baseline fuel in the 
aluminum group and as the bounding case fuel within that 
grouping. This proposed template analysis4 is intended to 
demonstrate how ATR fuels bound other aluminum fuel 
types. This is accomplished by calculating keffs within a 
common basket design, but with varying masses of fissile 
materials based on the individual fuel characteristics and 
their combined fissile loading inside a DOE standardized 
canister. Confirmation is reflected in the comparison of 
calculated keffs for canisters loaded with these other fuels 
against ATR fuels in various but comparable 
configurations using a common Type 1a basket design 
(see Figure 1). In all cases with reference to any keff value, 
it is always implied to mean keff+2V.
Results of this analysis evaluated the Type 1a basket 
proposed to accommodate aluminum-based fuels. This 
basket design has 10 compartments; the baskets will 
generally be stacked two or three high (depending on the 
length of the fuel) inside a DOE standardized 18-in.-
diameter/10-ft-long canister.5 The compartment walls of 
these particular baskets will be fabricated from a new 
material6,7 developed by the NSNFP, in conjunction with 
others, that consists of a high-nickel alloy containing 
2 wt% gadolinium. This weight percent loading of 
gadolinium in a 2-stack basket configuration inside a 10-ft 
canister equates to ~7.21 kg of gadolinium. The basket 
base plate and metal shroud on the outer perimeter of the 
basket will use a 300 series stainless steel. 
Figure 1. Cross-section of a Type 1a aluminum-fuel 
basket w/ ATR assemblies. 
ATR fuel (shown in Figure 2) was selected as the 
baseline fuel for the aluminum fuel group because of its 
fissile mass with 1085 g U235/assembly. Three other 
aluminum fuel types with the next highest fissile loadings 
within the aluminum fuel group also use this common  
Figure 2. ATR fuel schematic. 
basket design. Some of the details for these other fuels are 
portrayed in Figures 3, 4, and 5.  
Ideally, the desire was to create a standard basket 
model within the MCNP code and then be able to insert 
simplistic fuel shapes with their attendant fissile loadings 
for the criticality calculations. The goal of a template 
analysis was to demonstrate that the only key parameter 
of any significance was some measure of the fissile 
loading in the canister. This approach would save having 
to develop and certify discrete shapes and configurations 
for internal fuel details, e.g., plate thickness, fuel matrix 
composition or condition, or void fractions. 
To accomplish this task, a “smeared” case model was 
created using fuel assembly materials and moderator. 
They were blended within an intact fuel shape or footprint 
inside each basket compartment and reflected with water 
outside the fuel shape.  
The “homogenized” case model was created by 
mixing the fuel assembly materials of a given fuel with 
water inside each basket compartment. This latter model 
is considered to be an extreme fuel degradation case. In 
both cases, the mass of the cladding, uranium, and its 
alloying aluminum matrix material along with the water is 
preserved, but its distribution within the fuel shape or 
basket compartment is varied.  
The homogenized distribution is only hypothetical, 
considering that these uranium concentrations per  
Figure 3. ORR fuel schematic. 
Figure 4. MURR fuel schematic. 
Figure 5. MIT fuel schematic. 
compartment cannot be achieved either by suspension of 
particles in water (because of density differences) or 
uranyl (UO2
+2) ion as solute in water (because of 
solubility issues). But the homogenized approach does 
eliminate any specific fuel geometry dependencies. 
Experience with previous analyses of the other fuel 
groups1 has shown that within the confines of a standard 
canister, it is generally the more homogenized, fully 
flooded condition that provides the highest calculated keff.
To demonstrate that this effect is consistent between 
different fuels within the aluminum fuel grouping, the 
Type 1a basket design was analyzed for fissile loading 
both as a percentage against the baseline fuel and also for 
two pseudo-degraded fuel (smeared and homogenized) 
conditions for each fuel type.  
II. BASES AND CALCULATIONS 
Table 1 provides the basic fissile load limit and 
enrichment of each fuel analyzed in this template 
analysis. This information was further expanded into 
fissile loads per canister in terms of total fissile mass 
(kg U235/canister), linear fissile loading within the canister 
(g/cm), and a macroscopic (canister) fissile atom-density 
(atom/b-cm). Each of these parameters was then 
compared to the corresponding value for the baseline 
(ATR) fuel as a percentage. This summary portrays how 
each proposed canister load for these other fuels 
compared to the selected baseline (ATR) fuel.  
Comparisons showed that the MURR fuel type had a 
fissile loading per fuel element that was only 72% of the 
baseline ATR fuel. However, the proposed MURR 
canister loading resulted in a kilograms fissile load per 
canister that was 107% of that proposed for ATR fuel, 
with similar percentages for linear loading and atom-
density values. This added fissile per canister occurred 
because of using a 3-stack basket for the MURR fuel 
when the ATR packaging only required a 2-stack basket.  
One notable addition to the calculated keffs (Table 2) 
for the various configurations is the comparative keff value 
for ATR fuel in a 10-ft versus a 15-ft canister for the 
intact/ flooded model. While correctly cropped ATR fuel 
elements now in storage would fit in a 10-ft canister 
configuration, there are a number of assemblies that will 
not fit, thereby necessitating their loading in a 3-stack 
basket arrangement inside a 15-ft canister. This singular 
comparison illustrates that, for the calculated keff = 0.674 
for the loaded 10-ft canisters (~255 cm fuel cavity length) 
versus keff = 0.676 for the 15-ft canister, the 10-ft canisters 
are already at an infinite cylinder length. Comparison of 
the other fuels in 15-ft lengths was disregarded, because 
they are destined for loading in 10-ft canisters to balance 
against the 10-ft high-level waste (HLW) canisters in their 
proposed disposal configuration.1
The calculated keff values shown in Table 2 for the 
MURR fuel type demonstrate that the presumed bounding 
case—ATR fuel—was not bounding within the aluminum 
fuel grouping. The premise of loading in a 3-stack basket 
configuration with MURR fuel (23.48 kg) rather than a 2-
stack as for ATR (21.70 kg) resulted in the increased 
fissile loading. In this case, the calculated keff =1.0218 for 
the MURR fuel loading exceeded the ATR baseline fuel 
values for the homogenized case. The choice for 
packaging this fuel then becomes either the addition of 
more neutron poisons to the canister, or derating the 
canister for this particular fuel type by blanking off one or 
more of the basket compartments. For this derated 
analysis, the two center compartments were analyzed 
empty of fuel, but moderator was allowed in the 
compartment for any potential increase in reflection. The 
important point of this single MURR model was the 
revelation of the outlier fissile loading and an 
unacceptable keff. Once the homogenized case revealed a 
calculated value significantly below any expected 
subcritical limit, calculating the other keff values for the 
derated MURR canister were of little interest and hence 
omitted. 
In general, the increases in the calculated keffs are 
relatively predictable as a direct function of the fissile 
content inside a loaded canister. This is seen in the 
Figure 6 plot of keff+2V versus kg fissile loading in 
10-ft canisters. Furthermore the tabular values generally 
show, as was anticipated, increased reactivity going from 
intact/floodedÆ smeared Æ homogenized for each fuel 
type analyzed.  
However, there were a couple of noteworthy 
anomalies. The ORR moderately enriched uranium 
(MEU) aluminum silicide fuel experienced essentially no 
increase between the intact/flooded and smeared/flooded 
configuration. This may be a reflection of the already 
optimized plate configuration relative to the void space 
for water between the plates. The higher calculated keff for 
the ORR MEU fuel when compared to the ORR highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) fuel is easily explained with the 
increased fissile atom-density of the ORR MEU fuel even 
though the ORR HEU fuel has a greater enrichment.  
The homogenized MIT fuel result is interesting in 
terms of its keff value of 0.9206 when compared to the keff 
of 0.9543 for the ATR fuel. The macroscopic H/X ratio of 
293.6 is comparable to the 306.6 value calculated for the 
ATR fuel. Yet the ~73% of baseline fissile content in the 
MIT loaded canister would seem to justify a much greater 
difference between the two homogenized cases. If any of 
the calculated keffs for the MIT fuel had exceeded the 
corresponding ATR values, then such an anomaly would 
have warranted further investigation. Similarly, if any of 
the intact/flooded analyses raises concerns with a 
calculated keff greater than baseline, then analysis of the 
homogenized fuel condition would also require 
demonstration of a calculated keff less than the comparable 
baseline fuel result.  
TABLE 1. Comparison of Aluminum Fuel Parameter Values in Poisoned Baskets 
Fuel identifier Æ
ATR (HEU 
/ UAlx)
[baseline]
ORR*
(MEU / U-
Al-Si)
ORR
(HEU / 
U3O8)
MIT*    
(HEU / 
UAlx)
MURR* 
(HEU / 
UAlx)
MURR
[derated 
canister load] 
BOL % enrichment 93.15 20.56 93.15 93.15 93.15 93.15 
Assemblies/canister 20 30 30 30 30 24 
Fissile/assembly (kg) 1.085 0.347 0.300 0.525 0.783 0.783 
% of baseline 100 32 28 48 72 72 
Fissile/canister (kg) 21.70 10.41 9.00 15.75 23.48 18.79 
% of baseline 100 48 41 73 108 86 
Canister fissile linear 
loading (g/cm) 
85.526 41.001 35.447 62.003 92.488 73.990 
% of baseline 100 48 41 72 108 87 
Fissile atom-density / 
canister (atom/b-cm) 
1.45E-04 6.79E-05 6.02E-05 1.05E-04 1.57E-04 1.26E-04 
% of baseline 100 48 39 73 107 86 
* MURR (Missouri University Research Reactor); (ORR) Oakridge Research Reactor; MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
TABLE 2. Calculated keff + 2VValues
Fuel identifier Æ
ATR (HEU 
/ UAlx)
[baseline]
ORR*
(MEU / U-
Al-Si)
ORR
(HEU / 
U3O8)
MIT*    
(HEU / 
UAlx)
MURR* 
(HEU / 
UAlx)
MURR
[derated 
canister load] 
Intact/dry 0.0857 0.0767 - - - 0.0904 0.1121 - - - 
Intact/flooded
(10-ft canister) 
(15-ft canister) 
0.674 
0.676 
0.6440 
- - - 
0.6290 
- - - 
0.6135 
- - - 
0.787 
- - - 
- - - 
- - - 
smeared** 0.7021 0.6432 0.6377 0.6446 0.8291 - - - 
homogenized 0.9543 0.7524 0.6878 0.9206 1.0218 0.8592 
Macro H/X ratio 306.6 486.3 555.7 293.6 209.1 277.1 
* MURR (Missouri University Research Reactor); (ORR) Oakridge Research Reactor; MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 
** smeared = homogenized fissile, cladding and moderator within the fuel footprint 
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Figure 6. Graphical depiction of calculated keffs from Table 2. 
Comparison of these calculated keff results for the 
various proposed canister loadings of these selected fuels 
confirms how the decreased fissile loads for other fuels 
should experience a predictable decrease in the reactivity. 
At the time of loading all other aluminum fuels, the 
calculated keff values (derived through criticality safety 
evaluations) will be needed for the intact/dry and intact/ 
flooded conditions because of their planned 
reconfiguration. Such comparative analyses can also be 
used to address issues relative to criticality safety for 
transportation and repository disposal. 
The calculated keffs shown in Table 2 demonstrate 
that modeling a smeared fuel shape is more conservative 
than constructing a discrete model with its attendant 
plate/matrix thicknesses, matrix composition, and void 
spaces. As increased homogenization is introduced into 
the criticality model, the calculated keffs produce 
increased values. Use of the smeared fuel model obviates 
the need for detailed knowledge of internal fuel assembly 
geometry or condition of the fuel matrix. With added 
mixing of the fuel and moderator, the homogenized fuel 
configuration is even more conservative. This approach 
removes the issue of the variable associated with relative 
positioning of fuels within the various basket 
compartments. The fully homogenized fuel condition 
inside a basket compartment simplifies the geometry 
dependency generally associated with the numerous 
parametric models typically used to identify the optimum 
position of intact fuels within the various basket 
compartments. 
In retrospect, selection of the ATR fuel as the 
baseline case may still prove to have been a valid 
assumption for establishing a basket design that 
maximizes fissile loading in order to minimize loaded 
spent nuclear fuel canister counts destined for the 
repository. The use of this template analysis provided the 
identification of an outlier fuel loading and how derating 
the canister loading might affect an acceptable, calculated 
reactivity. The template analysis can also provide a 
simplified methodology for demonstrating maximum 
reactivity of other fuel loadings in a Type 1a basket, even 
if various aluminum fuel types are mixed within a given 
basket or canister. Figure 7 depicts how some of the many 
types of aluminum fuels can utilize the versatility of the 
basket in terms of basket compartment sizes relative to 
the fuel geometries identified for loading in a Type 1a 
basket.  
While the Peach Bottom fuel depicted in Figure 7 is 
not among the aluminum fuel grouping, its geometry 
would allow use of this basket in a continuous 
(nonstacked) configuration. For that situation, the fissile 
loading of the Peach Bottom fuel would also have to be 
compared against the ATR fuel on the basis of its 
placement in a Type 1a basket.  
All other fuels within the aluminum fuel group that 
are identified for loading in a Type 1a basket2 fall below 
50% of baseline fissile loading, whether based on a fissile 
per canister (kg), linear loading (g/cm), or fissile atom-
density (atom/b-cm). Even hybrid basket loadings with 
various fuels such as that depicted in Figure 7 could be 
easily modeled with the proposed template approach. 
Figure 7. Type 1a basket fuel disposal with various fuels. 
II. CONCLUSIONS 
Previous analyses related to ATR fuels3 analyzed 
those elements in a horizontal canister configuration using 
degraded conditions to determine the most reactive 
configuration, including full moderation. The need for 
poisoned baskets evolved from these ATR fuel packaging 
analyses.
The template analysis methodology has demonstrated 
the ability to ensure criticality safety for the baseline fuel 
fissile loading with ATR fuels. Subsequently, the analysis 
then showed that lower fissile loads, perhaps even with 
more optimal H/X ratios, are less reactive when using the 
same basket configuration for a multitude of fuel shapes 
with lesser fissile loads. This was demonstrated with the 
calculated keffs of the three next most heavily loaded of 
the aluminum fuel types in the aluminum fuel group. 
Use of the template analysis provides a method for 
identifying outlier fissile loads in proposed fuel 
packaging. After identifying the MURR fuels as a 
candidate for a derated canister loading, it was possible to 
demonstrate a reduced and acceptable reactivity for even 
the most conservative fuel configuration in a canister. 
In all cases, reactivity as measured by calculated keff,
analyses showed trends toward lower values in direct 
proportion to decreased fissile loading. Use of smeared 
analyses can also simplify the modeling needed for all 
fuels if geometries or fuel matrix condition relative to the 
internal fuel configurations might be in doubt. The 
homogenized fuel configurations within the bounds of the 
poisoned baskets can also be used to minimize or 
eliminate the added analyses usually needed for the 
multitude of geometric positions of fuel assemblies within 
a basket to determine the most reactive configuration. 
Ancillary benefits could also include simplification of 
analyses needed to support hybrid packing of multiple 
fuel types in the same canister/basket combination. 
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